

Message Text

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SUBJECT:SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH SUDANESE FOREIGN MINISTER

1. THIS TELEGRAM IS BASED ON AN UNCLEARED MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION AND IS SUBJECT TO REVISION. DR. MANSOUR KHALID, FOREIGN MINISTER OF SUDAN, MET WITH SECRETARY VANCE ON APRIL 6.

2. DR. KHALID REVIEWED THE SITUATION IN NORTH-WEST AFRICA.
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HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE FOLLOWING A CONTINENTAL STRATEGY WHICH EXTENDED AS FAR AS MAURITANIA AND MOROCCO AND WHOSE ULTIMATE PRIZE WAS EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA. IN ADDITION, ONE HAD TO CONTEND WITH THE MACHINATIONS OF COL. QADHAFI, A MENACE TO ALL HIS NEIGHBORS. IN ETHIOPIA, QADHAFI WAS WORKING IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SOVIETS. THE SOVIETS HAD DECIDED THAT SOMALIA WAS LESS IMPORTANT THAN

ETHIOPIA BECAUSE THE LATTER WAS A KEY FACTOR IN THE CONTROL OF THE RED SEA. FURTHER, ADDIS HAD A CERTAIN PRESTIGE AS THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE OAU. THE USSR, IN DEVELOPING ITS AFRICAN POLICY, HAD CLEARLY MISREAD THE ANGOLAN PRECEDENT. THERE THE AFRICANS HAD ACCEPTED A SOVIET EFFORT BECAUSE IT WAS AN ANTI-COLONIAL WAR. AFRICANS WOULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH A SOVIET ROLE IN A DIFFERENT COUNTRY.

3. IN REACTION TO THESE DEVELOPMENTS, SUDAN, EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA WERE NOW ATTEMPTING TO WORK WITH SOMALIA AND SOUTH YEMEN. THE MODERATE ARAB STATES WERE AIDED BY THE REALIZATION THAT THE SOVIETS HAD CONTRIBUTED LITTLE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THE SOMALIS HAD BEEN PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE, BUT IN SOUTH YEMEN THE SOVIETS HAD NOT DONE VERY MUCH EVEN IN THAT FIELD. THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER'S TRIP TO SOMALIA WAS A SEQUEL TO THE TAIZ SUMMIT. THERE THE SUDANESE, WITH SAUDI AGREEMENT, HAD CREATED A SORT OF POOR MAN'S CLUB AS THE MOST USEFUL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH TO WORK WITH SOMALIA AND SOUTH YEMEN. KHALID SAID A US DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN ADEN WOULD BE USEFUL.

4. THERE WAS A ROLE FOR THE U.S. TO PLAY. SUDAN WAS FACED WITH AN INSURGENCY WHICH, ALTHOUGH IT HAD DOMESTIC ROOTS, WAS NURTURED FROM THE OUTSIDE. KHALID THEREFORE SUPPORTED A COUNTER-BALANCING U.S. PRESENCE IN MILITARY AS WELL AS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. HE ADDED THAT THE USG SHOULD ALSO CAUTION THE SOVIETS CONCERNING THEIR AFRICAN POLICY.

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5. THE SECRETARY ASSURED KHALID THAT WE WERE TAKING THESE DEVELOPMENTS INTO CONSIDERATION AND HAD DISCUSSED THESE AREA QUESTIONS WITH PRESIDENT SADAT. THE SECRETARY HAD RAISED SOVIET AFRICAN POLICY IN HIS MEETINGS IN MOSCOW. WE WERE ALSO DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF ASSISTANCE WITH SOMALIA AND THE SECRETARY AGREED WE SHOULD PROBABLY GIVE FURTHER ATTENTION TO SOUTH YEMEN.

6. KHALID NOTED THAT MILITARY ASSISTANCE WAS IMPORTANT TO SUDAN WHICH, AS A RESULT OF KHARTOUM'S DECISION TO CHANGE ITS INTERNATIONAL POSTURE, HAD BEEN CUT OFF FROM RUSSIAN SPARE PARTS FOR TWO YEARS. IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION OF C-130'S, KHALID MENTIONED F-5 AIRCRAFT. HE EMPHASIZED THAT TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF U.S. ASSISTANCE. TOO SLOW A PROGRESS UNDERMINED FRIENDLY ELEMENTS IN THE SUDAN AND STRENGTHENED THOSE WHICH QUESTIONED THE VALUE OF THE NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. IN RESPONSE TO

THE SECRETARY'S QUESTION, KHALID LISTED THE MAJOR U.S.
PRIVATE SECTOR PROJECTS AND CONCLUDED BY EXPRESSING THE
HOPE THAT THE U.S. PUBLIC SECTOR COULD MATCH THE PRIVATE

EFFORT.
VANCE

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